Deleuze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality Daniel W Smith Aesthetics since Kant has been haunted by a seemingly irretractable dualism. On the one hand. aesthetics designates the theory of sensib- ility as the form of possible experience; on the other hand, it desig- nates the theory of art as a rdlection on real experience. The first is the objective element of sensation. which is conditioned by the a priori Conns of space and time (the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' aCthe en"rique of Pure Reason); the second is the subjective element of sensation, which is expressed in the feeling of pleasure and pain (the 'Critique of Aesthetic Judgment' in the Critique of Judgment), Gilles Deleuze ar- gues that these two aspects of the theory of sensation (aesthetics) can � reunited only at the price of a radical recasting of the transcenden- tal project as form!Jlated by Kant, pushing it in the direction of what Schelling once called a 'superior empiricism': it is only when the conditions of experience in general become the genetic conditions of real experience that they can be reunited with the structures of works of an. In this case, the principles of sensation would at the same time Constitute the principles of composition of the work of art, and conver- sely it would be the structure of the work of an that reveals these conditions. I In what follows, I would like to examine the means by �'hich Deleuze anempts to overcome this duality in aesthetics. follow- mg this single thread through the network of his thought, even if in tracing this line we sacrifice a cenain amount of detail in favor of a c.cnain perspicuity. The first pan analyses Deleuze's theory of sensa- tIon; the second, his attempt to connect this theory with the structures of the work of an. 30 Dam"el W. Smith 1 The Theory of Sensation: 'The Being of the Sensible' J. J Beyond Recog'licion and Commorl Sense Deleuze frequently begins his discussions of aesthetics by cel'en;n,g t,� a passage in the Republic where Plato distinguishes between twO of sensations: those that leave the mind tranquil and inactive, those that force it to think. The first are objects of recog" irion ('This a finger'), for which sensation is a more or less adequate judge. these cases,' writes Plato, 'a man is not compelled to ask of 1h"UI!h1 the question, "What is a finger?" for the sight never intimates to mind that a finger is other than a finger . . . There is nothing which invites or excites intelligence. 'z Deleuze defines recognition, Kantian terms, as the harmonious exercise of our faculties on object that is supposedly identical for each of these faculties: it is same object that can be seen, remembered, imagined, conceived, so on. To be sure, each faculty (sensibility, imagination, understanding, reason) has its own particular given, and its own of acting upon the given. We recognize an object, however, when faculty locates its given as identical to that of another, or more p,ec'''' Iy, when all the faculties together relate their given and relate selves to 8 form of identity in the object. Recognition cons,equen" finds its correlate in the ideal of common sense, which is defined Kant, not as a special 'sense' or a particular empirical faculty, but the supposed identity of the subject that functions as the��:�;��� of our faculties, as the principle that unites them in this accord. These are twO poles of what Deleuze terms the image of thought, and which constitutes one of the main objects critique: the subjective identity of the self and its faculties (c � :::;;:= sense), and the objective identity of the thing to which these refer (recognition). Thus in Kant, the 'object in general' or 'object x' is the objective correlate of the 'I think' or the SUbjective unity consciousness.1 But there also exists a second kind of sensation in the continues Plato, sensations that force us to think, that give rise thought. These are what Deleuze will term 'signs', for reasons we see below: they are no longer objects of recognition but objects ('If fundamental encounter. More precisely, they are no longer even ognizable as objects, but rather refer to sensible qualities o", , �:: : �: that are caught up in an unlimited becoming, a perpetual n of contraries. A finger is never anything but a finger, but a large Dtleu::e's Theory of Sensation: Owrcoming the Kantian Duality 31 at the same time be said to be small in relation to a third, just as ca:at is hard is never hard without also being soft, and so on. Recogni- � n measures and limits these paradoxical qualities by relating them 00 an object, but in themselves, these 'simultaneously opposed sensa-t?ons', says Plato, perplex the soul and set it in motion, they force it to �ink because they demand 'funher inquiry'. Rather than a voluntary and harmonious accord, the faculties here enter into an involuntary discord that lies at the base of Plato's model of education: sensibility compels the intelligence to distinguish the large and the small from the sensible appearances that confuse them, which in turn compels the memory to begin to remember the intelligible Forms.4 It is sensations of this second type, Deleuze argues, that constitute the basis for any possible aesthetic. Phenomenologists like Merleau- pontY, Straus, and Maldiney had already gone a long way toward freeing aesthetics from the presupposition of recognition. They argued that sensation, or rather 'sense experience' [/e stnrir1, must be analysed not only insofar as it relates sensible qualities to an identifiable object (the figurative moment), but insofar as each quality constitutes a field that stands on its own, even though it ceaselessly interferes with other qualities (the 'pathic' moment).� But they still remained tied to a form of common sense, setting up 'natural perception' as a norm, and locating its conditions in a sensible form or Gestalt that organizes the perceptive field as a function of an 'intentional consciousness' or 'lived body' situated within the horizon of the world. If Proust and Signs occupies a critical place in Deleuzc's oeuvre, it is because A la recherche du temps perdu, in Deleuze's reading, presents itself as a vast experi- ment with sensations of this second type, but one freed from the presuppositions of both recognition and common sense. In Proust, these signs no longer simply indicate contrary sensible qualities, as in Plato, but instead testify to a much more complicated network. of implicated orders of signs: the frivolous signs of society life, the deceptive signs of love, the sensuous signs of the material world, and the essential signs of an, which will come to transform the others. Proust's narrator will discover that, when he thought he was wasting his time, he was in fact already embarked on an intellectual appren- ticeship to these signs, a search for their meaning, a revelation of their truth. In each of these orders, the search inevitably passes through two eSSential moments: an 'objectivist temptation' that seeks for the lTleaning of the sign in the object emitting it (his lover, the madeleine), a . nd a 'subjective compensation' that seeks their meaning in a subjec- tlYe association of ideas. But in each case, the hero discovers that the lrUth of signs 'transcends the states of subjectivity no less than the 32 Daniel W. Smith propenies of the object': it is only in the work of art that their nature will be �vealed and their truth made manifest.6 This distinction between the recognized object and the encountered sign, Deleuze argues, corresponds to a more general distinction be- tween two images of thought. The 'dogmatic' or rationalist image can be summarized in several interrelated postulates: thought as thought Connally contains the truth (innateness of ideas, a priori nature concepts); thinking is the voluntary and natural exercise of a faculty, and the thinker possesses a natural love for the truth, a philia (hence the image of the thinker as a philo-sophos, a friend or lover of dam); we fall into error, we are diverted from the truth, by external forces that are foreign to thought and distract the mind from its vocation (the body, passions); therefore, all we need in order to truthfully is a 'method. I that will ward off error and bring us back to the truthful nature ofthought.1 It is against this more or less Greek image that Deleuze counterposes the empirical power of signs and the ibility of a thought 'without image': thinking is never the product of. voluntary disposition, but rather the result of forces that act thought involuntarily from the outside: we search for truth, we to think, only when compelled to do so, when we undergo a v';o)"oo:. that impels us to such a search, that wrests us from our natural what calls for thought, says Heidegger, is the perpetual/act that are not yet thinking';' the negative of thought is not error, which is mere empirical fact, but more profound enemies that prevent genesis of thought: convention, opinion, cliches, stupidity finally, what leads us to truth is not 'method' but 'constraint' 'chance': no method. can determine in advance what compels us think, it is rather the fortuitousness of the encounter tha,t , �':; , :'�:i the necessity of what it forces us to think. W"ho is it that in f� for the truth? It is not the friend, says Proust, exercising desire for truth in dialogue with others, but rathet the jealous maD, under the pressure of his lover's lies, and the anguish they inflict OD him.lo If Deleuze has always considered himself an empiricist, it is because. 'on the path which leads to that which is to be thought, everything begins with sensibility'. 1 I What then is a sign? In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze assigns twO primary characteristics to the sign. The first is that the sign riots the soul, renders it perplexed, as if the encountered sign were the bearer of a problem. The second is that the sign is something that can only be felt or sensed [ce qui ne peut eIre que smlll: as Francis Bacon says, it actS directly on the nervous system, rather than passing through the detour of the brain.12 It is this second characteristic that reveals most clearly De!eu=e's Theory of Se"sotio,,: Overcoming the Komian Duality 33 the difference between the encountered sign and the recognized ab- . " the latter can not only be felt, but can also be remembered, lec . . agined, conceived, and so on, and thus assumes the accord of the �:uhies that Kant calls common sense. By taking the encountered sign as the primary element of sensation, Deleuze is pointing, object- ively, (0 a sci.mce 0/ the sensible .t:eed from the m�1 of recognition a"d, subjectifJely, w a use of the foeullles /reed from the Ideal 0/ commo" sense. Now Kant himself had already hinted at this latter possibility in the Critique of Judgment where, for the first and only time, he considered a faculty freed from the form of common sense, namely, the faculty of the imagination. Up to that point, Kant had been content to create as many common senses as there were natural interests of reasonable thought (knowledge, morality, reflection), common senses which dif- fered according to the conditions of what was to be recognized (object of knowledge, moral value, aesthetic effect . . . ) . In the en"rique of Pure Reason, for example, the faculties are made to enter into a harmonious accord in the speculative interest, in which the understanding legis- lates over and determines the function of the other faculties ('logical common sense'); in the Critique of Practical Reason, the faculties enter into a different accord under the legislation of reason in the practical interest ('moral common sense'); and even in the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' of the Critique of Judgment, the reflective imagination is still said to be under the 'aesthetic common sense'" Il But the third Critique opened up the possibility of a new domain, a 'disjunctive' theory of the faculties. In the 'Analytic of the Sublime', the faculty of the imagination is forced to confront its own limit, its Own maximum: faced with an immense object (the desert, a mountain, a pyramid) or a P9werful object (a storm at sea, an erupting volcano), the imagination strives to comprehend these sensations in their to- tality, but is unable to do so. It reaches the limits of its power, and finds itself reduced to impotency" This failure gives rise to a pain, a cleavage in the subject between what can be imagined and what can be thought, between the imagination and reason" For what is it that Pushes the imagination to this limit, what forces it to attempt to unite the immensity of the sensible world into a whole? Kant answers that it is nothing other than the faculty of reason: absolute immensity or POwer are Ideas of reason, Ideas that can be thought but cannot be k.nown or imagined, and which are therefore accessible mlly to the faCulty of reason. The sublime thus presents us with a disunsion, a 'discordant accord', between the demands of reason and the power of the imagination. But this painful admission also gives rise to a plea- SUre: in confronting its own limit, the imagination at the same time 34 Daniel W. Smith goes beyond this limit, albeit in a negative way, by representing itself the inaccessibility of this rational Idea. It presents to itself fact that the unpresemable exists, and that it exists in sensible nature,l. From the empirical point of view, this limit is inaccessible and aginable; but from the transcendental point of view, it is that can only be imagined, that which is accessible only to the 'imagim,ti,oQ; in its transcendental exercise, The lesson of the 'Analytic of the Sublime', in Deleuze's ': ; �:':�f]'i: that it discovers this discordant accord as the condition of � for the harmonious accords of the faculties that Kant evoked in first two critiques, an accord that is not derived from external 'facts' (the 'fact' of knowledge. the 'fact' of morality), but ' engendered internally in the subject. It is this possibility of a &sjunc. tive use of the facu1ties, glimpsed fleetingly by Kant with regard to imagination, that Deleuze will extend to the entire critical proj"ct Rather than having all the faculties harmoniously united in an act recognition, each faculty is made to confront its own differential and is pushed to its involuntary and 'transcendental' exercise, exercise in which something is communicated violently from one faculty another. but does not fonn a common sense. Such is the use of the fa; � �;: put forward by Proust: a sensibility that apprehends and r signs; an intelligence, memory, and imagination that interpret and explicate their meaning, each according to a certain type of ,;,,, and a pure thought which discovers their essence as the reason of the sign and its meaning. What Deleuze calls a therefore neither a recognizable object nor even a particular q,,,]ity . an object, but constitutes the limit of the faculty of sensibility each faculty in its tum must confrOnt its own limit). As Deleuze it, the sign is not a sensible being, nor even a purely qualitative (aisthlwn), but the being afthe sensible (aisrhetton). From the cal point of view, the sign, in and of itself, is unsensible, not in contingent way, as if it were too small or too distant to be grasped our senses, but in an essential way, namely, from the point of view recognition and common sense, in which sensibility can only grasp can also be grasped by the other faculties. But from the trans,ce"d,,",a1 point of view, the sign is what can only be felt or sensed, that which accessible o,dy to the faculty of sensibility in its transcendental cise. The sign, in short, points to a pure aesthetic lying at the * . sensibility: an immanent Idea or differential field beyond the norms common sense and recognition. What then is this Idea of se,,,ibilii,,- What are these forces of the 'outside' that nonetheless give rise thought? 1 .2 Deleu=e's Theory of Sensation: Owrcomi"K the Kamian Duality 35 The Idea of Sensibility: Differential Relations and Differences in Intensity Already in 1790, Salomon Malmon, one of the first post-Kantians to lurn to Leibniz, had proposed an essential revision of Kant on re reciSely this point. I' Leibniz argued that a conscious perception must �e related, not to a recognizable object situated in space and time, but to the minute and unconscious perceptions of which it is composed. I apprehend the noise of the sea or the munnur of a group of people, for instance, but not the sound of each wave or the voice of each person that compose them. These unconscious 'molecular' perceptions are �lated to conscious 'molar' perceptions, not as pans to a whole, but as what is ordinary to what is noticeable or remarkable: a conscious perception is produced when at least two of these elements enter into a dijfermu*al relation that detennines a singular point.16 Consider, for example, the colour green: yellow and blue can be perceived, but if their perception diminishes to the point where they become indiscer- nible, they enter into a differential relation (db/dy = G) that deter- mines the colour green; in tum, yellow or blue, each on its own account, may be detennined by the differential relation of two colours we cannot detect (dy/dx = V). Or consider the noise of the sea: at least twO minutely perceived waves must enter into a relation capable of detennining a third, which 'excels' over the others and becomes conscious. These unconscious perceptions constitute the 'ideal genetic elements' of perception, or what Maimon called the 'differentials of consciousness'. It is such a virtual multiplicity of genetic elements, and the system of connections or differential relations that are established between them, that De- leuze terms an 'Idea': the relations are actualized in diverse spatia- temporal relationships, JUSt as the elements are actualized in diverse perceptions and forms. A sign, in its first aspect, is thus an 'effect' of these elements and relations in the Idea: a clear perception (green) is actualized when cenain vinual elements (yellow and blue) enter into a differential relation as a function of our body, and draws these ObScure perceptions into clarity. 11 Deleuze suggests that Bergson, in The Creative Mind, had developed a somewhat parallel conception of the Idea, using the domain of color �s an example. There are two ways of detennining what 'colours' have In common. Either one can extract from panicular colours an abstract �nd general idea of color (,by removing from the red that which makes It red, from the blue what makes it blue, from the green what makes it 36 Daniel W. Smith green'); Qr onc can make all these colours 'pass through a conve"g ... lens. bringing them to a single point', in which case a 'pure white is obtained that 'makes the differences between the shades out'.'8 The first case defines a generic 'concept' with a plurality objects. in which the relation between concept and object is one subsumption, and the state of difference remains exterior to the The second case defines a differential Idea in the Deleuzian sense. different colours are no longer objects under a concept, bo,t< 'm,,'i",� an order of mixture in co-existence and succession within the Idea; relation between the Idea and a given color is not one o: . :� . �:�� �: but one of actualization and differentiation; and the state of between the concept and the object is i,llenlaJized in the Idea White light may be a universal, if you will, but it is a cone .. . universal, a universal variation, and not a genus or generality. It,, ,,," of colour is like white light. which 'perplexes' within itself the elements and relations of all the colors, JUSt as the Idea of sound be conceived of as white noise.l<) This notion of the differential Idea finds its complement in concept of intensity: these elements and relations 8re actualized in an intensive magnitude. Kant himself had defmed principle of intensity in the 'Anticipations of Perception': we priori that the matter of sensations will have a degree of intensity, that this magnitude will change along a continuum starting from point where intensity = O.lO But since he defined thefonn of se,,,il)iIiI as extended space. Kam limited the application of intensity to matter of sensible intuitions that come to fill that space. But Mai."" like Hermann Cohen after him, argued that since space as a intuition is a continuum, it is the form of space itself that must defined a priori as intensive quantity: there is therefore an internal dynamic construction of space that necessarily precedes the entation of the whole as a form of exteriority (which implies that is actualized in a plurality of fonns).2l In empirical experience. to sure, we know only intensities or forms of energy that are localized and distributed in extended space: intensity is ;",e,,,,'abl from a process of extension that relates it to extended space subordinates it to the qualities that fill space. But the corresp.onolinl tendency is no less true, since every extensity necessarily envelops implicates within itself the intensity of which it is an effect. A 'sign' its second aspect, is an intensity produced by the asymmetry of differential relations, whereas a 'quality' appears when an' ����::: reaches a given order or magnitude and these relations are 0 in consciousness.22 Sensations thus present a double aspect: De!euze's Theory 0/ Sensation: Overcoming the Komia" Duality 37 'sarily refer to a virtual and implicated order of constitutive ntee . . '{Terences, but they tend to cancel out those differences In the exdl ded order in which they are explicated. These intensive forces are te:er given in themselves, they cannot be grasped by the empirical oe nses• which only grasp intensity as already recovered or mediated by :e qualitY that it creates. They can only be sensed from the point of .jeW of the uanscendental sensibility that apprehends it immediately � the encounter as the limit of sensibility itself. With the notion of m . , . d 'ntensity. he wnles, sensauon ceases to be representative an �eCO!Tles real'. Hence the formula: 'intensity is both the unsensible and that which can only be sensed'. n What MaImon derives from this Leibnizian argument is a transcend- ental method of genesis rather than one of simple conditioning: a clear sensation emerges from obscurity by a genetic process, as it were through a series of filters, a series of successive integrations or syn- theses. In the en*rique oj Pure Reason, Kant reserved the power of synthesis for the active 'I think', for the activity of the understanding, and conceived of the passive ego as a simple receptivity possessing no synthetic power. Because be considered the sensible to be a quality related to an object that sensibility intuited passively. he defined tbe transcendental form of space. as the condition of outer sense. by its geometric extension (pure intuition of objects or bodies). And if concepts in tum could be applied to intuitions, if a harmony was possible between the understanding and sensibility, it was only through the mysterious intermediary of the 'schematism' of the im- agination, which alone makes the spatio-temporal relations of intui- tion correspond to the logical relations of the concept. But the problem with the Kantian method of conditioning, which post-Kan- tians such as Maimon and Cohen were quick to point out, is that it leaves unexplained the purely external duality between the determin- able (space as a pure given) and the determination (the concept as thought), invoking 'hidden' harmonies between terms that remain external to one another.i• What the post-Kantians argued (as did Freud) is that the passive ego is itself constituted by a prodigious �omain of unconscious and passive syntheses that precede and condi- liOn the activity of the 'J think'. Beyond Kant's external method of conditioning, MaImon proposes �!l i'ltemai method of genesis in which the relation between the determ- Inable and the determination is internalized in the Idea. Rather than perCeption presupposing an object capable of affecting us, and the COnditions under which we would be capable of being affected, it is the r�tiprocal determination of differentials (dx/dy) that entails both the 38 Danul W. Smirh complete detennination of the object as perception and the d."" ... inability of space-time as conditions: space-time aases to be a j'u," ,n, .. i" order to become the totality or nexus of differential relations in the s��:� and the objea ceases co be an empirical given in order to become the p of these relations in conscious peruption. 'Difference is not diversity,' writes Deleuze. 'diversity is given, difference is that by which the given is given, by which the given given as diverse. '2S The error of the dogmatic image of thought is to deny diversity, but to tend to comprehend it only in terms generalities or genera. One of Deleuze's philosophic aims is to that the singularity and individuality of the diverse can only be prehended from the viewpoint of difference itself. The Idea of tion is constituted by two interrelated principles of difference: differential relations between genetic elements, and the differences intensity that actualize these relations. They do not indicate some of metaphysical reality beyond the senses; as Ideas they are po*sited _ order to account for sensibility, though they are not given in ence as such. Whereas in Kant, Ideas are unifying, totalizing transcendent, in Deleuzc, they are differential, genetic, and ent. It is the series of filters, for example, mat accounts for Nietzsche called the faculty of forgetting, or Bergson's claim perception is necessarily eliminative and subtractive: subjectivity (rather than simply has) an incomplete, prejudiced, and partial ception.26 Conversely, the significance of sensory distortions, those achieved in pharmacodynamic experiences or physicaJ OX" .,,; .. ces such as vertigo, is often to approach the intensive always implicated in the perception of extensity: a kind !.� �:;:�; of the senses" says Deleuze, that forms an integral part of entalism.27 Deleuze not only gives an account of 'narural but also experiences that are often classed as 'pathological', to he assigns a positivity of their own. Indeed, in his commentary Leibniz, Deleuze goes so far as to write that 'every perception hallucinatory because perception has no object', since it refers exch"ive\ to me psychical mechanism of differential relations among scious perceptions.28 This is why difference must be understood, as an empirical fact or even as a scientific concept, but as a ",onsce,nd: ental principle, as the sufficient reason of me sensible, as the being the sensible. Descartes had posited the 'clear and distinct' as the highest p�:�:! of common sense, a principle that would be prolonged i� forms in the post-Kantian tradition extending through Fichte Hegel: the finite mind finds its point of departure in a confused Dcleuze's Theory of Sensation: O1;ercoming the Kancian Duality 39 b cure understanding of the world, and reason constitutes a universal o s gress towards the clear and distinct, 'the light which renders ��Ught possible in the common exercise of the faculties'.l' In the lesser known [jgu�e� of Ma!mo� a?d Cohen, Deleuze finds. a 'minor' st.}(antian tradition leadmg mdlrectly to Bergson and Nietzsche: a �ar idea is in itself confused, and is confused iruofar as ir is clear. The c onscious perception of the noise of the sea, for example, is clear but �onfused, for our perception comprehends the whole confusedly, and only expresses clearly certain elements and relations depending on the threshold of consciousness determined by our body. Conversely, the components of the Idea are distinct but obscure: distinct, insofar as all the drops of water remain distinct as the genetic elements of percep* tion, with their differential relations, the variations of these relations, and the singular points they determine; but obscure, insofar as they are not yet 'distinguished' or actualized in a conscious perception. Every sensation, in shon, is clear but confused, but is constantly plunged back into the distinct-obscurity from which it emerged. In Deleuze, the pn'ncipie of the clear and distiller is broken down inkJ two irreducible values that can never be reunited to constitute a nalural light. Deleuze's theory of sensibility, in sum, is opposed to Kant's on these three interrelated points: the element of sensation must be found in the sign, and not the qualities of a recognizable object; the sign is the limit-object of the faculty of sensibility, beyond the postulates of recognition and common sense; the Idea of sensibility is constituted by differential relations and differences in intensity, which give a genetic account of thought and constitute the conditions of real, and not merely possible, experience, since the conditions are never larger than what they condition. 2 The Theory of Art: 'Pure Beings of Sensation' 2.1 Philosophy and An :ith this rather summary sketch of Deleuze's theory of sensation in :nd, we are now in a position to determine its relation to the theory �. an. If Deleuze's many writings on art constitute an integral part of o�s p,hilosophy, it is because works of an are themselves explorations thiS transcendental realm of sensibility. The most general aim of art, aCCord' . . be' Ing to Deleuze, IS to produce a sensation, to create a 'pure o I?g of sensation', a sign.)O The work of an is, as it were, a 'machine' r apparatus' that utilizes these passive syntheses of sensation to 40 Daniel W Smith produce effects of its owo. The genetic principles of sensation are at the same time the principles of composition of the work of an; conversely, it is the structure of the work of art that reveals conditions. Deleuze has consequently developed his 'logic' of tion through a creative interaction with the various ans. In What Philosophy? Ddeuze defines philosophy as a practice of concepts, discipline that consists in the formation, invention, or creation concepts. 'One can very easily think without concepts,' he writes, as soon as there is a concept, there is truly philosophy.'ll Art is equally creative enterprise of thought, but onc whose object is create sensible aggregates rather than concepts. Great artists arc great thinkers, but they think in terms of sensan*ons rather than cepts. Painters, for example, think in terms of lines and musicians think in sounds, film-makers think in images, and so Neither discipline has any privilege over the other: to create a is neither more difficult nor more abstract than creating new audible combinations; and conversely, it is no easier to read an than it is to comprehend a concept. As a philosopher, Deleuze's aim in his studies of the arts is to the conceptS that correspond to these sensible aggregates. Bacon: Logique tk Ia stnsan"on creates a series of philosophic concep each of which relates to a particular aspect of Bacon's paintings. text is organized in a quasi-musical fashion, divided into ,,,,e,". sequences or series that develop local concepts as if they were lines, which in tum are made to enter into increasingly complex puntal relations, and which together form a kind of conceptual sition that parallels Bacon's sensible compositions. Similarly, D"le'uJI two-volume Cinema is 'a book of logic, a logic of the cinema' that out 'to isolate certain cinematographic concepts', concepts which proper to the cinema, but which can only be formed ph;lc"oph,k'.u� The same must be said for Deleuze's essays in music, literature, and theatre, notably those collected in Crin*que et clinique.JJ Modem art and modem philosophy converged on a similar lem: both renounced the domain of representation and instead the conditions of representation as their object. Paul Klee's phrase echoes through Deleuze's writings on the arts like a kind motif: not to rmder the ttisible. but to render visible.)4 T'went;eth-"."tuI painting aimed not at the reproduction of visible forms but the entation of the non-visible forces that act behind or beneath forms. It attempted to extract from these intensive forces 'a block sensations', to produce a material capable of 'capturing' these in a sensation. When pious critics reproached Millet for pa;n'tdll Deleu:::e's Theory 0/ Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality 4 1 ants who were carrying an offertory like a sack of potatoes, Millet peas onded by saying that what maners in the painting is not what the res�ant is carrying, but rather the exact weight common to the twO p��ec(s: his aim was to render the force of that weight visible in the o !nting. In the paintings of Cezanne, who gave this notion offorce its rl t full expression, mountains are made to exist uniquely through the I�:logical forces of folding they harness, landscapes through �eir �erT1lal and magnenc forces, apples through the forces of germma- tion. Van Gogh even invented unknown forces, such as the extraordi- nary force of a sunflower. Proust discovered that what the worlds of signs render visible are nothing other than the various invisible struc- tures of time (passing time, wasted time, time regained).l5 Modem music has perhaps confronted this problem most directly, trying to develop a highly complex and elaborate material capable of making the nonsonorous forces of time audible, a material that could render duration sonorous, as in the rise of timbre in Stravinsky and Boulez, Edgar Varese's ionization of sound, or John Cage's experiments in noise such as the prepared piano. 16 Properly speaking, there is no 'theory of art' in Deleuze: 'an' itself is a concept, but a purely nominal one, since there necessarily exist 'diverse problems whose solutions are found in heterogenous arts'. Hermann Broch wrote that 'the sole raison d'itre of a novel is to discover what only the novel can discover',)' and each of the ans, and each work of an, confronts its own particular problems, utilizing its own particular material and techniques, and attempting to capture intensive forces of very diverse types. To say that the aim of an is not to represent the world, but to present a sensation (which is itself a composition of forces, an intensive synthesis of differential relations), is to say that every sensation, every work of art is singular, and that the conditions of sensation are at the same time the conditions for the production of the new. For this reason, we will limit ourselves here to Deleuze's examination of the oeuvre of a single anist in Francis Bacon: Tilt Logic 0/ Sensario'i. z.z The 'Figure' O�e of the most important concepts in Deleuze's analysis of Bacon is : at Deleuze calls, following Lyotard, the 'figural', which stands r PPosed to figuration or representation. The danger of figuration or .:\presemation in painting is that it is both illustrative and narrative: it e ates th . b" th . " Sub , e Image to an 0 Ject . at It supposedly Illustrates. thereby Ordtnating the eye to the model of recognition and losing the 42 Daniel W. Smith immediacy of the sensation; and it relates the image to the images in the painting, thereby tempting us to discover a narrative between the images. As Bacon says, 'The story that is already told between one figure and another begins to cancel out the ibilities of what can be done with the paint on its own" n, �:fc:s�'': plays a similar role in painting as does recognition in p Painting has neither a story to [eU nor an object to represent: painting itself is a sensation, an encountered sign. But this is p,ect .. what constitutes the difficulty of the artistic task: 'It is a very, close and difficult thing,' says Bacon, 'to know why some paint across djrecdy onto the nervous system and other paint tells the in a long diatribe through the brain.'39 We return to Deleuze's Is: the sensation produced by the painting is something that can be felt or sensed. How does one attain a sensation in painting? Bacon's attempt 'paint the scream' is an exemplary case in point. His aim is not to the visible horrors of the world before which one screams, he says. rather the intensive forces that produce the scream, that convulse body so as to create a screaming mouth: the violence of a spectacle must be renounced in order to attain the violence of sensation. Expressed as a dilemma, one might say: either he paints horror (the 'sensational') and does not paint the scream, be,c .. ,,, represents a horrible spectacle and introduces a story; or he painb scream directly (the 'sensation') and does not paint the visible because the scream is necessarily the capture of an invisible Bacon, like Cezanne, was so severe with his own work, and destroyed or renounced many of his paintings, including many screams, it was because they failed to anain the sensation, and back into the cliches of figuration and narration. Deleuze poses problem in this way: 'If force [intensityJ is the condition of ",.,do it is nonetheless not the force which is sensed, since the "gives" something completely different from the forces that condit! it.' So that the essential question of the artist becomes: 'How sensation be able to tum in upon itself, extend or contract sufficiently, in order to capture, in what is given to us, forces that not given, in order to make us sense these unsensible forces, elevate itself 10 its own com/ieions?'40 This then is the task faced artist: How can the material used by the artist (paint, words, attain this level of forces? How can it become capable of 'b,,.r'n,:' . sensation? Deleuze suggests that there are two general routes through modem painting escaped the cliches of figuration and attempted Delell::e'S Theory of Sensation: Owrcoming the Kamian Dllality 43 'n the sensation directly: either by moving towards abstraction, or altai . else by movmg towar�s the figur.al. :ne first movement, towards b traction, developed In several directIOns, but was perhaps marked a SIWO extremes. At one pole, an abstract art like that of Mondrian or �andinskY' though it rejected classical figuration, still retained an senal of abstract forms that tried to rerme sensation, to dematerialize � to reduce it to a purely optical code. It tended towards a plane of I ;chitectonic composition in which the painting became a kind of :piritual being, a radiant material that was primarily thought rather than felt, and called the spectator to a kind of 'intellectual asceticism'. At the other pole, abstract �xpreuionism, like that of Jackson Pollock, went beyond representation nOt by painting abstract forms, but by dissolving all forms in a fluid and chaotic texture of lines and colours. It attempted to give maner its maximal extension, reversing its subor- dination to the eye, exhibiting forces by a purely manual \ine that no longer oudined or delimited anything, but was spread out over the entire surface. Now in breaking with representation, both these poles of abstraction also broke with the ancient hylomorphic model, which conceived of the artistic task as the imposition of form upon maner: the abstrac- tionists wanted to free up the form in an optical code, while the expressionists wanted to free up matter in a manual chaos. What the hylomorphic schema ignores in defining form and matter as twO separate terms, as Gilbert Simondon showed, is the process of con- tinuous 'modulation' at work behind them. Matter is never a simple or homogenous substance capable of receiving forms, but is made up of intensive and energetic traits that not only make that operation POssible but continuously alter it (clay is more or less porous, wood is more or less resistant); and forms are never fixed molds, but are determined by the singulan"ties of the material that impose implicit processes of deformation and transformation (iron mths at high tem- peratures, marble or wood split along their veins and fibres). This is the importance of Deleuze's notion of intensity: beyond prepared matter lies an energetic materiality in continuous variation, and be-�ond fixed form lie qualitative processes of deformation and trans- Ormation in continuous development. What becomes essential in :Odem an, in other words, is no longer the maner-form relation, lit the maten*al-fora relation. The artist takes a given energetic �al�rial composed of intensive traits and singularities, and syn-tStles its disparate elements in such a way that it can harness or � apture these intensities, what Paul K1ee called 'the forces of the osmos' .41 44 Daniel W. Smith This task is not without ambiguity, technical and otherwise. synthesis of the disparate elements of a material requires a co"',ln d ..... of consistetlcy, without which it would be impossible to distinguish elements that constitute the sensation. Klee, for example, said that order to produce a complex sensation, in order to harness the "",cc • • the cosmos and render them visible, one must proceed with a gesture that simplifies the material, selects it, limits it. All one ne"", i a pure and simple line, an inflexion, and he was infuriated when complained about the 'childishness' of his drawings,42 If one muh;pl" the lines, if one elaborates too rich and complex a material, the that one is opening oneself up to all events, to all irruptions of but in fact one can merely wind up producing nothing but a that effaces all lines. a 'sloppiness' that in fact effaces the sensation. It was in order to avoid this danger, as well as the danger formalism, that Bacon followed a second path, which finds its sor in Cezanne. and for which Lyotard coined the term Whereas 'figuration' refers to a form that is related to an object it supposed to represent (recognition), the figure is the form that connected to a sensation. and that conveys the violence of this tion directly to the nervous system (the sign). In Bacon's paln,;np,' is the human body that plays this role of the Figure: it functions as material support or framework that sustains a precise sensation. frequently begins by isolating the human body inside a contour, putting it inside a circle. a cube, a parallelepiped; balancing it on II placing it on an armchair or bed. The isolated Figure is then to a series of deformations through a series of manual making random marks, throwing the paint at the canvas, brushing the painting. These techniques have a double effect: one hand, they undo the organic and extensive unity of the body, instead reveal what Deleuze calls its intensive and non-organic on the other hand, these marks also undo the optical organization the painting itself, since this force is rendered in a precise . that does violence to the eye. The marks reveal the precise point application of the intensive force contorting the body, a cramp spasm twisting the figure [rom within. making the body shudder vibrate violently. Bacon's primary subject matter is the body by a plurality of forces: the violent force of a hiccup, a need to vomit or defecate, of copulation, the flattening force of Despite those who find Bacon's paintings horrific, Bacon's figures not tortured bodies, but ordinary bodies in ordinary situations discomfort, just as a person forced to sit for hours would Inevitalbl assume contoned postures. Deleuze'S Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kanrian Duality 45 Bacon, the Figure is the suppan for a precise sensation; without !11 support, the sensation would remain diffuse and ephemeral, lack-�IS clarity and duration. In many ways, Bacon's criticisms of expres-l�g ism had already been anticipated in Cezanne's criticisms of sion . . . rh 'fr ' d" f . ressionism: sensation IS not In e ee or Ismcamate play 0 ;:t and colour; it is in the body, and not in the air, whether this body . the human body (Bacon) or the body of an apple (Cezanne). :�ensa[jon is what is being painted,' writes Deleuze, 'what is painted on the canvas is the body, not insofar as it is represented as an object, but insofar as it is experienced as sustaining this sensation. '4) This then is the via media followed by Bacon: without a material framework, the sensation remains chaotic, but on its own the framework remains abstract. 2.3 The Asymmetncal Synthesis a/the Sensible How does the Figure attain the 'sensation' in Bacon's painting? We have seen that every sensation is intensive, it implicates within itself a difference in quantity between unequal forces; it is thus necessarily synthetic, effecting a passive and asymmetrical synthesis between forces. 'Every sensation is already an "accumulated" or "coagulated" sensation.'44 A sensation cannot capture the 'forces of the cosmos', in other words, unless the anist is capable of effecting such syntheses in the material. If we left the nature of these syntheses unexplored until now, it is because it is in the work of art that they are most clearly revealed. On this score, Deleuze has analyzed three fundamental types of asymmetrical syntheses of the forces that Bacon effects in his work.4' 'Vibration " or the Connective Synthesis: the constrnccion of a single sen'es. The first type of synthesis is vibration, which characterizes a simple sensation. Even this simple type of sensation, however, is already composite, since it is defined by a difference in intensiry that rises or falls, increases or decreases, an invisible pulsation that is more nervous than cerebral. Like every great paimer, Bacon will attain this vibratory �tate primarily through a complex use of colour. The Impressionists .f ad already discovered the role of complememary colours in paiming: l one is . . b palOtlng grass, there must not only be a green on the canvas, U h t.also the complememary red, which will make the tone vibrate, and ac leve a l' . rh . t'W sun It sensation at IS produced by the 'flash' between these I 0 Complememary colours. Cezanne, after having reproached the s�ressionists for submerging the object and depicting the atmo-P ere, refused to separate the tones according to the visual spectrum 46 Danul W Smith (the Newtonian conception of colour) and instead mixed his plementary colours in critical proportions (in a manner closer Goethe's theory of colour than Newton's), thereby attempting restore to the object a 'Figure' through a progressive moliuialj01l chromatic nuances.46 Bacon will do much the same when he stitutes the flesh of his Figures through a flow of po,ly"h,onlll colours, which are frequently dominated by blue and red, the of meat. 'Each broken tone indicates the immediate exercise of a upon the corresponding zone of the body or the head, it im.m"di." renders a force visible .• 47 When Deleuze writes, in the preface Francis Bacon, that the summit of the logic of sensation lies in 'colouring sensation', it is because, for the painter, 'rendered' through pure relations of colour, colour is discowred differential relan*on upon which everything else depends. Even a sensation is a relation between colours, a vibration. Jean-Luc is one of the great colourists of the cinema, and his statement Weekend - 'It's not blood, it's red' constitutes one of the fonnulas of colourism.41 'Re1Qnana', or the Conjumtiw Synwru: the convergence of (az letul) sen*es. The second type of syntheses. more complex. is that of ance. In this case, two simple Figures or sensations, rather than being isolated and defonned, confront each other, like two in a 'hand-to-hand combat', and are thereby made to resonate. for instance. frequently puts two bodies in a single painting, that are copulating or sleeping entangled, in such a way that the themselves are rendered indiscernible. and are made to together in a single 'matter of fact', in order to make som"th,ing "PI'! that is irreducible to the two: this sensation, this Figure. argues that the great example of resonance in literature can be in Proust's involuntary memory. in which two sensations (f,,, ins ... the present flavour of the madeleine and the past memory of bray) are coupled together in order to make a pure Figure appear internalizes the difference between the two sensations: C�::�;:;,;:: self. What is important in resonance is that (at least) twO are coupled together. and from them is extracted an ineffable (Proust) or 'figure' (Bacon) that is irreducible to either of something new is produced.49 'Forced Movement', or Disjunctive Synthens: the affirmation ofdi'h�" sen*es. Finally, there is the most complicated of these syntheses, Deleuze calls a forced movement. This is no longer a coupling sensations, but on the contrary their distention or deviation. In this appears most clearly in the triptychs, in which the Figures. Delcllze'S Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kamia" Duality 47 being isolated or coupled, are set apan from each other in than ale panels, How can the separated Figures oCthe triptychs be said separesent a single 'matter of fact'? It is because in them the separated t� prres achieve such an extraordinary amplitude between them that flst;imitS of sensation are broken: sensation is no longer dependent the n a Figure per se, but rather the inlensjf)e rhythm 0/ force itself ;::mes the Figure of the triptych. The Figures loosen their grip on each [�er, and are no longer united by anything but the distance that ° eparates them, and the light, the air, or the void which insens itself �etween them like a wedge. It is because of this amplitude that Deieuze assigns a privileged place to the triptychs in Bacon's work. �o Vibration, resonance, and forced movement are the concepts Deleuze creates to describe the three types of syntheses that Bacon utilizes to 'paint the sensation'. In general, these constirute the intens- ive conditions of sensation, the three 'varieties' of compositions of sensation, the three modalities of a 'being of sensation'. To be sure, each of these syntheses co-exist in Bacon's paintings, which are con- crete assemblages of differences, mixed states. In the individual paint- ings, for example, the large fields of uniform colour already effect a distancing function similar to that of the triptychs (disjunction), but are likewise themselves composed of subtle variations of intensity or saturation (connection) ; and vibrations in turn are already effects of resonance, since they couple together diverse levels of sensation (con- junction).51 The important point is that the artist utilizes these intens- ive syntheses in order to produce 'a pure being of sensation'; the work of art is a functional 'machine' that produces effects of vibration, resonance, and forced movement. The question that must therefore be posed to a work of art, argues Deleuze, is not 'What does it mean?' (interpretation) but rather 'How does it work? (experimentation): ':'Vhat are the connections, what are the disjunctions, the conjunc- bons, what use is made of the syntheses?'52 �e sensation itself, however, must not be confused with the materi- al In which these syntheses are effected. Art is composition, but the technical composition of the material is not the same as the aesthetic composition of the sensation. It is true that in fact (quid faca'?) the sensation I I ' . ch ' asts no onger than ItS suppOrt or matenals (stone, canvas, ti e�lcal colour, etc.), But in principle at least (quidjun's?), the sensa- lo on IS of a different order than the material, and exists in itself for as us�t as the material lasts. Oil painting, Deleuze suggests, provides a In I example of this distinction, since it can be approached in two pr:�ners. In a first case, the sensation is realized in Ihe maten'al and Jetted Onto it: an outline is sketched on a white background, and 48 Daniel W. Smith colour, light and shade are added afterwards. In a second cast, modem art has increasingly tended to adopt, it is the materia} passes into sensation: rather than beginning with a sketch, the gradually 'thickens' the background, adding colour alongside piling up or folding the material in such a way that the ",:hit"""" the sensation emerges from the medium itself, and the becomes indiscernible from the sensation. In either cast, how.v .. is matter itself that becomes expressive, so that one can say of sensation itself that it is metallic, crystalline, stony, colouring, on. The material constitutes the de facto condition of the 'eo,sa" and insofar as this condition is satisfied, even if only for a few (as in Tinguely's self-destructing creations), it gives the com"o'lIl4I created sensations the power to exist and to be preserved in itself: a 'monument'.H The work of an is thus a synthetic unity. But what is the this unity, if the heterogenous elements it synthesizes have no relation to each other than sheer difference? The elements together by the work of an cannot be said to be fragments of . unity or shattered totality, nor can the pans be said to prefigure the unity of the work through the course of a dialectical development or an organic evolution. Rather than ing as their totalizing or unifying principle, the work of art can understood as the effecl of the multiplicity of the disconnected (The work of art produces a unity, but this product is simply a .that is added alongside the other parts. The artwork nei', h.nmifi •• totalizes these parts, but it has an effect on them because. �it::,�:::� syntheses between elements that in themselves do not c and that retain all their difference in their own dimensions. An lishes 'transversals' between the elements of multiplicities, but out ever reducing their difference to a form of identity or, ��;�: the multiplicity into a totality. The work of an, as a c sensations, is not a unification or totalization of differences, but the production 0/ a new dif!ere'lCe, and 'style' in art always begins the synthetic relations between heterogenous differences.'4 Deleuze's aesthetic theory is not a theory of reception, an the spectator's judgments of a work of an, but a theory written from the point of view of creation. Its guiding What are the conditions for the production of the new? In light question, our aim �as been to show how Deleuze's philosophY 'difference' overcomes the duality with which aesthetics has encumbered since Kant. On the one hand, in breaking with the of recognition and common sense, and the image of thought De/tIIZe's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantiatl Duality 49 . h they 3rt derived, Deleuze locates the element of sensation, not �hlC recOgnizable object but in an encountered sign. The sign con-In, a tes the limit-object of sensibility, an intensive product of diff'eren-S�I�U elations: it is intensity, and not the a priori forms of space and �a : that constitutes the condition of real, and not merely possible, om erieDee. On the other hand, these genetic principles of sensibility cXP . tb . . I f * * f tb k f at the same time e pnnclp es 0 composltton 0 e war 0 an. �e artist uses th�se. intensive synthes�s to produce a bloc of sensa- . os and in tum It IS the work of art Itself that reveals the nature of �oese' syntheses. In this way, Deleuze's logic of sensation reunites the twO dissociated halves of aesthetics: the theory of forms of experience (as 'the being of the sensible') and the work of art as experimentation (as 'a pure being of sensation'). 'The work of art quits the domain of representation in order to become "experience", transcendental em- piricism or the science of the sensible.*n If Deleuze's various writings on art are, as he says, 'philosophy, nothing but philosophy', it is precisely because they constitute explorations of, and experimenta- Dons within, this transcendental domain of sensibility. NOTES For Deleuze's formulations of the aesthetic problem, see DiflertnCl and Rt�rilion ( l 968J, trans. Paul Patton, New York.: Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 56-7, 68; and Thl Lc,u oj Sensl (19691, trans. Mark Lester, ed. Constantin Boundas, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 260. 2 Plato, Republic, Vll, 523b. Deleuze appeals to this text in Difference and Repetition, pp. 138-42, 236; Nietzsche and Philosophy, Irans. Hugh Tom- linson, London: Athlone, 1983, pp. 108, 210 (n. 33); Proust and Signs, trans. Richard Howard, New York: George Braziller, 1972, pp. 96, 166. 3 See Deleuze's analyses in K4nr's Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine 01 the FtUulties, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984, esp. p. 15. 4 PISlo, Repl4blic, 524d; see also Philebus, 24d; Parmenides 154-155; and Thtatlttus, 152-155. These paradoxes, known in antiquity as Megarian sOrites ('How many grains constitutes a heap?'), are treated in formal lOgic as 'vague predicates'; see Pascal Engel, The Norm oj the True, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991, pp. 1 99-215. Deleuze treats S �he theme or becoming in The Logic 0/ Seme, series I, pp. 1-3. S ee. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phe'lomenology oj Perceprion, trans. Colin s mIth, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967, pp. 216-17; Erwin lraus, The Primary World 0/ the Senses: A Vindication 0/ Smsory Experi. 50 Daniel W. Smith ence, trans. Jacob Needleman, New York: Free Press, 1963, pp. and Henri Maldiney, Regard Parole EsptUt. Lausanne: Editiolll d'Hommc, 1973, pp. 134-8. For DeJeuze's criticisms, see Cinema Mowmtnt-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habbcrjun, neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 57; Francis Bacon; 10 sensation, Paris: Editions de la Difference, 1981, pp. 31-3; an4 ference and &pelilion, p. 137. 6 ProWl and Signs. p. 36. Plato, in Deleuzc's reading, remains tied model of recognition in twO ways: in defining the sign as a contrariety, Plato confused the: being of the sensible with a sible: being [ais/hewnl. and he: related it to an already-uisting merely shifted the operation of recognition to the process of ccnce. For the critique of Plato, see DifftrenCl artd Repetitwn, pp. for Proust's break with Platonism, see Prouse and Sizns, pp. 96-1 7 The analysis of images of thought is one of the central objects leuze's philosophy: see in general Prouse and Sips, pp. 159-67; and Philosophy, pp. 103-10; and Di/fmnce and Repetition, pp. More specific analysis of these 'noological' themes can be found Logic of Sense, pp. 127-33 (height, depth, and surface as �::�':: thought) and A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi, University of Minnesota Press, 1987, pp. 3-25 (the tree and the as images of thought), pp. 374-80 (the State-fonn venus • thought), and 474-500 (the smooth and the striated). 8 Martin Heidegger, Whae is Called Thinking, trans. Fred D. Wieck Glenn Gray, New York: Harper & Row, 1968, p. 28. Heidegger, ever, still retains the theme of a desire orphJ;,., ,ub,tiltut;." m"" .... the 'gift' for those of violence, and adhering to the subjective tion of a pre-ontologicai undentanding of Being. If Artaud important rote in Deleuze's thinking, it is because his case p�"'"'''' clearest form, the fact that what thought is forced to think is impotence, itS own incapacity to take on fonn on itS own: problem was not to orient his thought, but simply to manage to something. Hence the detennining importance of images ofth,'u' .... being mad belong to thought in principle, or is it simply a feature of the brain that should be considered as a simple Difference and Repetition, pp. 146-7 (commentary on Artaud) and p. n. 1 1 (criticisms of Heidegger) . 9 Deleuze has analysed each of these figures of negativity: on m.p;':;. Nietzsche and Philosophy, p. 105 ('stupidity is a structure of such . . . it is not error or a tissue of errors . . . there are thoughts, imbecile discourses that are made up entirely of '"',''''� convention, see Proust and Signs, p. 160 ('truths remain "t,;",,,, abstract so long as they are based on the goodwill of thinking. conventional is explicit . . . Minds communicate to each other onl1 conventional'); on opinion, see What is Philosophy1, trans. Hugh Deleu:e'S Theory of Sensation: Owrcoming the Kantian Duality 5 1 n and Graham Burchell, New York: Columbia University Pr�s, 1 994, 50 144--50 (,opinion is a thought closely molded on the form of recogni-���'); on cliches, particularly as they pose .a problem for the artist, see The Movement-Image, pp. 208-9, and Francu Bacon, pp. 57-63. According to Proust, jealousy is not a disease of love but its truth, its 10 finality, and all love is 'a dispute over evidence', 'a delirium of signs' " (Proust and Signs, PP: .1 17, 122). . . . . Dif!ere,,,e and Repetlnon, p. 144; sec also Expremomsm m Philosophy: Spi,/O:!(l, trans. Manin Joughin, New York: Zone Books, 1 990, p. 149: 'One is always struck by the diverse inspirations of empiricists and rationaliSts. One group is surprised by what fails to surprise the others. If we listen to the rationalists, truth and freedom are, above all, rightS; they wonder how we can lose our rights, fall into error or lose our libeny . . . From an empiricist viewpoint, everything is invened: what is surprising is that men sometimes manage to understand truth, sometimes manage to understand one other, sometimes manage to free themselves from what fetters them.' 12 Francis Bacon, The Brutality of Fact: Inlerows with David Sylvester, London: Thames and Hudson, 1975, p. 18. Il Kant presents this theory of common sense in the Critique of Judgment, SJ8-22, §40. 14 Sec ibid., S29, General Remark. Kant's 'Analytic of the Sublime' lies at the centre of Jean-Franc;ois Lyotard's conception of'posnnodc:m' art, which he defines as that which prumu the unpru.muWk in his essay 'Answering the Question: What is Posnnodemism?,' in TM Posrmodem Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984, pp. 71-82. There is a profound diffettnce between Deleuzc and Lyotard, despite numerow lines of conver- gence between their respective theori� of an: Delcuzc's theory is derived from an analysis of sensibility (intensity), whereas Lyowd's is derived from the faculty of the imagination (the sublime). Lyotard sometimes speaks of the 'imagination or sensibility' in the same sentence (e.g., pp. 80, 81), but without ever taking the funher step of extracting the limit-element of sensi- bility, which is precisely not that of the imagination. The difference would scem 10 bear on the nature of the Ideas appealed 10 each instance: transcend- ent in the case: of the imagination, immanent in the case of sensibility. For Lyolard's analysis of the sublime, sec his imponant commentari� in Ln£ons on the Analytic oftlu SubJimt, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1994. 15 Salomon Maimon, Venuch Qber dit rrans%mdalllal phiJosophit, Berlin: Christian Vos, 1 790. For commentary, see above all Manial Gueroult, La phi/osophit transctndentale de Salo"um Marmon, Paris: Alean, 1929. �sp: PP. 55ff and 76ff; Sylvain Zac, Salomon Marmon: Critiqut de Kant, C ans: C::erf, 1988, esp. ch. 6; and Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason, ambndge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987, pp. 295-303. "qo;:",. o tR'!-. 52 Daniel W. Smith 16 Note on the differenti41 relation, The nature of the differen"' ; ;:';I ; �:� ; �� be made clear by comparing three types of relation d mathematics. A fiTSt type is e1ilablished between elements that selves independent or autonomous, such as 3 + 2 or 2/3. The are real. and these relations themselves must be said to be real. ty�. for example Xl + Y. RI = 0 (the algebraic equation for the established between terms whose value is unspecified, but which thelcss must in tach CIISt have a determined value. Such relations called imaginary. But the third type of relation is established elements that themsdves have no determined value, but that n,',,,,,,, arc: determined reciprocally in the relation: thus ydy + xcix = 0 universal of the circumference or the corresponding dy/dx =-x/y (the expression of a curve and its trigonometric These are differential relations. The elements of these relations detennined, being neither real nor imaginary: dy is completely mined in relation to y, dx is completely undetennined in relation they are perfectly determinable in the differential relation: the themselves do not exist apan from the differential relation into they enter and by which they are reciprocally detennined. This lial relation, in turn, determines a singular point, and it is the set poinls that detennines the topological space of a given ."�, . triangle, for example, has three singular points, while curves and are derived from more complex distributions). Sec Deleuze, 'A reconniit-on la structuralisme?', in Fran�ois ChAlelel, ed., Hisroi,. philosophie rome 8: Le XXe siicle, Paris: Hachene, 1972, �P�;. �!�� Fold: Leibniz and the &roque. uans. Tom Conley, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993, p. 88; Repetititm, pp. 172-5. 1 7 For Deleuze's interpretation of Lcibniz's theory of perception, Fold: Leibni:: and the Baroque, ch. 7, 'Perception in the from which the above examples are taken. For Lcibniz's sec Dijcourse on Metaphysiu, 533; jal Mind, 514; Monadology, 520-25; Principla 0/ Nature and and the New Euays, chapter I . 1 8 Henri Bergson, The Creatiw Mind, trans. Mabelle L. Andison, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1965, p. 225. �:�;:.:'t:.:�;': example in 'La Conception de la difference chez Bergson', niennes 4, 1956, pp. 771 1 2 , and draws out its consequences in TIu 0/ Sellse, p. 136: 'To have a colour is not more general than to be because it is only this colour, and this green which is this nuance, related to the individual subject. This rose is not red without redness of this rose. ' Deleuze is closer to Goethe than Newton. theory of colour has similarly been retrieved in cenain ,o,"<oml:'!'! scientific theories: redness is no longer perceived as a band-width but as a singularity within a chaotic universe, whose boundaries Deleuze 's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kamiall Duality 53 alwayS easy [0 describe; see James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science, London: Sphere, 198 8, pp. 164-6. Likewise, o�e co. uld s�eak of a white society or a wh!te langu�ge, which 19 nlains in Its vtrtuahty all the phonemes and relations destmed to be C�tualized in the diverse languages and in the remarkable parts of a same �anguage; see DifferellCe and Repetition, pp. 20}-7. For a fuller analysis of musical form along these lines, see Jean-Fran�ois Lyotard, 'Several Silen- ces', in Dnltworks, ed. Roger McKeon, New York: Semiotext[e), 1984, pp. 99-110. . . 20 Immanuel Kant, CMtlque 0/ Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan, 1929, A1691B21 1 : 'Every sensation has a degree, that is, an intensive magnitude which can always be diminished (to the point where the intensity = OJ . . . Every colour, as for instance red, has a degree which, however small it may be, is never the smallest; and so with heat, the moment of gravity, etc.' 21 Hermann Cohen, Kants Theone der Erjahnmg, 2nd edn, Berlin: Dumm- ler, 1885, p. 428: 'Space and time itself, the sensible conditions of the unity of consciousness, insofar as they represent quanta continua, are constiruted as continua by the realily oj interuive magnitude as the condi- tion of thought. Intensive magnitude consequently appears immediately as the prior condition of the extensive . . . Such was the necessity that led to the infinitely small, positing something that became a unity not in relation to One but in relation to Zero' (p. 428). See Jules Vuillemin's commentaries in L 'Heritage kanrien et la ri'Volution copernicienne: Fichu, Cohen, Heidegger, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954, pp. 132-207. 22 Difference and Repetition, p. 20: 'By "sign" we mean what happens within such a [differential] system, what flashes across the intervals when a communication takes place between disparates. The sign is indeed an effect. but an effect with two aspects: in one of these it expresses, qua Sign, the productive dissymmetry; in the other it tends to cancel it.' 23 Frallcis Bacon, p. 34; Difference ond Reperirion, p. 230. 24 Kant himself admitted that this schematizing power of the imagination was 'blind', 'an art concealed in the depths of the human soul', an activity 'nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover' (Cririque oj Pure Reason, A78fBJ03, AI41/BI80-181). It is for this reason that Heidegger tOok the imagination as the focal point of his reading of Kant, in KiJnr and the Problem 0/ Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill, Bloomington: India25 na University Press, 1962. 26 �Wert1/ce and Repetition, p. 222. IC\Zsche, Genealogy 0/ Morals, Essay II, §l, pp. 57-8: 'What we experi- �nce and absorb enters our consciousness as little while we arc digesting It . • . as does the thousandfold process involved in physical nourishment . . . so that it will be immediately obvious how there could be no happi- ness, no cheerfulness, no hope, no pride, no preSel'll, without forgetful54 Daniel W. Smith ness.' Berpon, Matter and Memo!)" trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scan Palmer, New York: Zone Books, 1988, pp. 35-6: we never perceive objects per se, but rather objects minus those aspects that do not intereat us as a function of our needs. 27 Difference and Repetirion, p. 237. In the chapter on 'The Perception- Image' in The Mowment-Imap, Deleuze argues that, if the cinema goes beyond normal perception, it is in the sense that it reaches this genetic element of a1l possible per�ption: 'In the "'kino-eye", Ven.ov was aimine to attain or regain the system of universal variation in itself,' to 'reaeb "another" perception, which is also the genetic element of all perception' (pp. 80-6). 28 The Fold: Ltibni:: and the Baroque, p. 93. 29 Difference and Repetition, p. 213. Martial Gueroult discusses the role thia notion played in post-Kantian philosophy in L'Ewlution et la su crure . la Doctrint de la Science chez Fichu, Paris: I.es Belles I.ettres, 1930, vol. pp. 14ff ('clear and distinct understanding was posited as the fruit of continuous development whose point of departure was the ':::i'��� understanding, the sole fonn under which the totality of the could be given originally in the finite mind'). 30 W'hat is Philosophy', p. 167. 31 Deleuze, NegotUltions 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin, New York: umbia, 1995; d. The Timt-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Galeta, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, p. 280: theory of cinema does not bear on the cinema, but on the concepts cinema, which are no less practical, effective, or existent than ,h "in"m� itself.' 32 Negotiations 1971-/990, p. 47. The Mowmtnt-lmage, p. ix. 33 Deleuze, Critique et clinique, Paris: Minuit, 1993. 34 Paul Klee, 'SchOpferische Konfession', in Das Bildnersiche Dtnken, 1964, p. 76, as quoted in Francis Bacon, p. 39 and A Thousand PI'.", .... p. 342; sec also Maldiney's commentary in Parole Regard Es/Xlce, 1 4 3-6. Lyotard's similar formula - 'not to represent, but to present unpresentable' is discussed in 'The Sublime and the Avant-Garde', . The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Universitf Press, 1988, pp. 89-107. 35 See ProUSl and Signs, pp. 17-18: 'Time, which usually is not visible, seeD out bodies in order to become visible, seizing bodies wherever it en-- counters them so as to cast its magic lantern,' modifying this feature someone we knew long ago, elongating, blurring, or crushing that one. Deleuze distinguishes four structures of time in Proust: lost time is both 'passing time' and 'waned time'; time regained is both a 'time recovered' at the heart of time lost, and an 'original time' that is affirmed in an. 36 For these examples, see A Thousand pta/taws, p. 343; Francis Bac0I1, p. 39. 37 Quoted in Milan Kundera, The Art of Ihe N(1'IJti, trans. Linda Asher, New' York: Grove Press, 1988, pp. 5, 36. De/euze's Theory of Sensation: Overcoming the Kantian Duality 55 38 Bacon, The Bmralil)' 0/ Fact, p. 23. 39 Ibid., p. 18. 40 Francis Bacon, pp. 39-40. 41 Gilbert Simondon, L'individu et so genise physiw-biologique, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964; Deleuze was heavily influenced by Simondon's text. 42 Paul Klee, On Modern An, trans. Paul Findlay, intro. Herbert Reed, London: Faber, 1966, p. 53: 'Had I wished to present man "as he is", then 1 should have had to use such a bewildering confusion of lines that pure elememary representation would have been out of the question. The result would have been vagueness beyond recognition.' 43 Fra/zcis Bacon, p. 27. 44 Francis Bacon, pp. 28-9; cf. Difference and ReJHlition, p. 234. 45 The primary texts on these sensible syntheses in art are: Frana! Bacon, pp. 48-9; What is Philosophy?, pp. 167-8; and Proust and Signs, pp. 131-42. 46 In Newton, for example, the 'optical' grey is obtained through a combi- nation of black and white, whereas in Goethe the 'haptic' grey is obtained through a combination of green and red. See Goethe, Color Theory, ed. Rupprecht Manhaei, New York: Van Nostrand, 1971. On Cezanne's relation to the Impressionists with regard to colour, see Maurice Mer- leau-Ponty, 'Cezanne's DOUbt,' in The Essential WritingJ, ed. Alden L. Fischer, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969, p. 236. 47 Francis Bacon, p. 96. 48 The Movement-Image, p. 1 18. On these relations of colour, see Deleuze's discussion in Francis Bacon, ch. 15, 'La traversee de Bacon', pp. 93-7. 49 On the role of resonance in involuntary memory, see Proust and Signs, ch. 5, 'The Secondary Role of Memory', pp. 5 1-64 Goyce's 'epiphanies', Deleuze suggests, can be analysed in the same manner). On coupling in Bacon, see Francis Bacon, ch. 9, 'Couples et triptyques,' pp. 45-9. 50 On 'forced movemem' in Bacon, see Francis Bacon, ch. 10, 'Qu'est-ce qu'un triptyque?', pp. 51-6. The question concerning the conditions under which disjunction can be a fonn of synthesis (and not an analytic procedure that excludes the predicates of a thing by vinue of the identity of its concept) is one of the decisive questions posed by a philosophy of difference. though it lies beyond the scope of this paper. For Deleuze's discussions of the problem. see 'La synthese disjonctive' (with Guartari), in L'Arr: 43 1970, pp. 54--62 and The Logic 0/ Sensarion, pp. 172-6, '1 294--7. In Whal is Philosophy? (p. 168), Deleuze suggests that, of all the arts, it is perhaps sculpture that presents these three syntheses in an almost pure state: first, there are the sensations of stone, marble, or metal, which vibrate according 10 strong and weak beats; second, there are the pro- tuberances and cavities in the material, which establish powerful combats that interlock and resonate with each other; and finally, there is the set-up 56 Daniel W. Smith of th� sculptu�. with larg� empty spaces between groups, or even within a single group, in which one no longer knows if it is the light or air that sculpts or is sculpted. 52 Deleuze and Guanari, Anti-Oedipus, trans. Roben Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R Lane. New York: Viking, 1977, p. 109. 53 On the relarion of the sensarion to the material, see What is PhilosofJhy�. ch. 7, passim, esp. pp. 191-7. 54 See Anti-Otdipws, p. 42: the work or art 'is a whole o/its constituent pans but does not totalize them; it is a unity of its particular pans but it does not unify them; rather, it is added to them 85 a new part fabricated separately'. On the concept of 'transvenality' fonnulated by Guanari, see Anust and Signs, pp. 149-50 (and p. 157, n. 106). 55 Difftrtnu and Repetition, p. 56.